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Hate Speech, Dignity, and the Westboro Baptist Church 
 
This thesis analyzes America’s approach to free speech and hate speech in comparison to 
international law. Focusing on 2011 Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps, I will discuss how the 
court’s approach to expression fails to comply with standard human rights norms. I will compare 
domestic and international approaches to hate speech, as well the harms of such expression to 
dignity. Additionally, I will trace the history of the Westboro Baptist Church, American 
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The United States of America’s approach to contemporary free speech has long stood as 
an outlier among freedom of expression norms, one regarded as often radical in comparison to 
other Western nations. With other advanced democracies in possession of strong, functional hate 
speech law paradigms—with Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and other European nations 
at the helm—America’s stance remains acutely rooted within the limitations of the First 
Amendment. On several notable occasions, this position has clashed with preexisting human 
rights contexts and laws, with free speech trumping the right to dignity.1 I intend to argue that 
rights based free speech laws would be better suited in determining and defining hate speech, as 
well as protecting individuals from emotional harm. This rights-based structure would entail the 
consideration of international law, with the main objective being to fulfill human rights as 
stipulated by the UDHR.2 Such a structure would incorporate human rights norms from relevant 
charters emphasizing dignity for all. The US government, as duty bearers of multiple human 
rights charters, have an obligation to fulfill their responsibilities to right bearers. Perhaps the 
most fundamental human right is the right to dignity. The United States’ incitement-based 
approach—based in the marketplace of ideas theory-- overrules dignity in favor of expression. 
Over the last century, Supreme Court decisions such as Smith v. Collin (1977), R.A.V. vs. City of 
St. Paul (1994), and most recently Snyder v. Phelps (2011) have affirmed the United States’ 
opposition to content-based hate speech prohibitions.3 Instead of disallowing speech on the 
                                               
1 Waldon, Jeremy, “Hate Speech and Democracy”, Criminal Justice Ethics 23, No. 1: (2013): 78 
2 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Paris, 1948), General 
Assembly Resolution 217A, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (accessed 
11/12/17) 
3 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); see also R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul (90-7675), 505 U.S. 
377 (1992); Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) 
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grounds of discriminatory speech, America bases its definition of hate speech on incurred 
threats—namely, determined by if the speaker intended to provoke physical violence against a 
person or group. The American understanding of hate speech is therefore based upon the 
category of incitement, safeguarding most forms of expression. Thus, with incitement as the 
basis, speech acts are “more generally protected because the law does not capture the actual 
content of the speech act, only the ‘inciting’ manner in which it was expressed,” with the focus 
on HOW the content was said as opposed to WHAT was said.4 But paradoxically, often the 
medium—no matter how offensive—is legally tolerated due to the speaker’s right to convey 
their idea. American hate groups have often managed to work within the realms of content based 
free speech legislation to convey their message. Groups such as the Westboro Baptist Church can 
continue to violate others’ right to dignity and propagate hate speech—insofar that they stay 
within the bounds of American defined incitement.  
The 2011 Supreme Court Case Snyder v. Phelps is demonstrative of the U. S’s flawed 
judicial approach to hate speech legislation. By reversing the decision of the United State District 
Court for the District of Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Fred Phelps—the 
patriarch of the Westboro Baptist Church—citing protection of his First Amendment rights.5 
Through this ruling, the United States Supreme Court clarified a definition of free speech that 
runs afoul of ratified and widely accepted international human rights norms-- namely, the UDHR 
as well as Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.6 I shall argue that America's iteration of hate speech fails 
                                               
 
4 Sorial, Sarah, “Hate Speech and Distorted Communication: Rethinking the Limits of 
Incitement” Law and Philosophy 34 (2015): 299 
5 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
6 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (16 December 
1966) with resolution 2200A (XXI), 20(2) 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (accessed 1/13/18) 
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to comply with human rights freedom of expression soft laws, with the American “all speech is 
equal” principle problematic. I will begin with a background of the WBC, and then go through 
why indictment is not sufficient for determining hate speech. Additionally, I will examine 
contrasting international law approaches to free speech, as well as relevant conceptions of human 
dignity as they pertain to the Snyder v. Phelps case. 
 
Westboro Baptist Church Background 
 In order to understand the legal route taken by the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps, the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s (WBC) background and objectives must be explored. It is also 
crucial to note their how their tactics work to inflict major emotional damage upon their targets, 
sidestepping legal ramifications. Designated a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center, 
the WBC is an American based cult of personality centered around late family patriarch, Fred W. 
Phelps Sr. The senior Phelps stood out as a fire and brimstone public nuisance as early as his 
college years, with his family—later his church—growing in notoriety as one of America’s most 
well-known hate groups. Founded in 1955 in Kansas, the group currently consists of 70 to 80 
members of Phelps’s immediate and extended family. Unlike other churches, they do not attempt 
save individuals from damnation. They do not engage in any type of recruitment, refusing 
outside donations. The group views most outsiders to their sect as corrupted by the influences of 
the secular world and thus ineligible for admission. The WBC are family based and insular 
without any outside affiliations; any new members have since married into the group. The church 
communicates via an old school, Southern gospel preaching style, utilizing press releases, 
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sermons and social media.7 Their internet usage is extensive, spreading their message through 
parodies of popular songs (such as Pharrell’s “Happy) with the lyrics replaced to reflect WBC’s 
homophobic ideology. They are also extremely active on Twitter and Instagram. Most 
notoriously, the WBC communicates their beliefs via street picketing protests. The group 
considers it their utmost duty to be the mouthpiece of God, denoting themselves as “WMPs” or 
“Weapons of Mass Publication”. Their extremely public demonstrations of inflammatory, yet 
legally sanctioned, protests have included picket signs with slurs (“God Hates Fags”), flag 
burning, statements that causalities of 9/11 and other national tragedies would burn in hell, 
funeral protesting, and a wide range of assertions about God’s hatred for America. Westboro is 
highly mobile and motivated; according to the group’s website, they have conducted over 60,614 
protests to date.8 In line with being God’s mouthpiece, the WBC actively seeks out media 
attention and are extremely receptive to reporters. Westboro currently pickets on a near-daily 
basis. 
 The theodicy of the WBC is crucial to their protests. Akin to Calvinism, Westboro 
believes in an omnipotent God possessing absolute power. Their God is not a forgiving one. The 
WBC believes that only a select few have been selected for forgiveness (with the church 
members among them) with the rest of humanity doomed to an eternity in hell. In several 
interviews with the group, members describe God as a “Jealous Man of War” in reference to a 
                                               
7 Powell-Williams, Todd, and Powell-Williams, Melissa, “’God Hates Your Feelings”: 
Neutralizing Emotional Deviance within the Westboro Baptist Church”, Deviant Behavior 
(2016): 2 
8 Westboro Baptist Church, “Homepage” godhatesfags.com. 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/index.html (accessed 11/13/17) 
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passage of the Book of Isaiah, 42:13.9  WBC members view God is as a supreme being in active 
engagement with the earthly world. In this theology, God is responsible for causing the world’s 
ills in a direct response to mankind’s sexual wickedness. Every unfortunate event which befalls 
man—from terrorist attacks to natural disasters—is demonstrative of God conveying his fury. 
God particularly despises the United States for its growing acceptance of homosexuality; a 
vehement stance not unusual in the context of conservative hate groups ranging across the 
politico-religious gamut. However, Westboro takes their position to an extreme. The WBC 
directly links homosexual behavior with events such as the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shootings and 9/11. Their website states plainly, “WBC engages in daily peaceful sidewalk 
demonstrations opposing the homosexual lifestyle of soul-damning, nation-destroying filth. We 
display large, colorful signs containing Bible words and sentiments, including: GOD HATES 
FAGS, FAGS HATE GOD, AIDS CURES FAGS, THANK GOD FOR AIDS, FAGS BURN IN 
HELL, GOD IS NOT MOCKED, FAGS ARE NATURE FREAKS, GOD GAVE FAGS UP, NO 
SPECIAL LAWS FOR FAGS, FAGS DOOM NATIONS, THANK GOD FOR DEAD 
SOLDIERS, FAG TROOPS, GOD BLEW UP THE TROOPS, GOD HATES AMERICA, 
AMERICA IS DOOMED, THE WORLD IS DOOMED, etc.”10 These signs and slurs are crucial 
to the shock value of Westboro’s protests, attracting media attention and propagating their 
notoriety. With their placards serving as calling cards, the WBC have established a sort of 
instantly recognizable brand name within the American media landscape. 
                                               
9 Baker, Joseph O., Bader, Christopher D., Hirsch, Kristen, “Desecration, Moral Boundaries, and 
the Movement of Law: The Case of the Westboro Baptist Church”, Deviant Behavior 36, Iss. 1 
(2015): 44 
10 Westboro Baptist Church, “About WBC”, godhatesfags.com, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html, (accessed 11/20/17) 
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The differentiating factor distinguishing the WBC from other hate groups is not their 
homophobic belief system, but instead their clever use of legal tactics while working within the 
confines of law.11 With Phelps once a well-known Civil Rights lawyer, and several of his 
children well-versed in First Amendment Law, the WBC collectively possess an unusual mastery 
of the workings of the American judicial system. Despite being disbarred at the state level in 
1979 for berating a witness (Phelps v. Supreme Court) Phelps continued to employ his 
knowledge of the law in his workings and protests, even going as far to run for public office. 
Westboro’s protests all remain within the bounds of legality. The group carefully coordinates 
pickets with local police departments and respects all protest established limitations. During their 
protests, they neither yell or verbally express profanity, and make a point to never step within the 
realms of what could be considered incitement to violence. Even when physically harassed by 
onlookers, the church’s protestors refuse to retaliate. Thus, by respecting local laws and federal 
incitement-based hate speech laws, the WBC are continually allowed to invoke their freedom of 
expression. Another crucial differentiation between the WBC and other fundamentalist groups is 
their advanced use of media manipulation. Even though technically the group doesn’t engage in 
any violent incitement, their extremely provocative language and choice of protest locations oft-
attract a swarm of media attention—with the WBC reveling in their status as one of America’s 
well-known hate groups. Unlike other fundamentalist religious groups who might keep a low 
profile as not to draw negative attention, the WBC utilize the media and embrace their self-
proclaimed roles as God’s messengers. The media coverage of their exploits accomplishes a 
twofold task: fulfilling what they consider to be their earthly duties, all while conflating the 
                                               
11 Baker, Joseph O., Bader, Christopher D., Hirsch, Kristen, Desecration, Moral Boundaries, and 
the Movement of Law, 43 
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public and the private sphere. This further exemplifies the ability of the WBC to offend and 
emotionally disturb on a mass scale.  
Westboro has a preoccupation with the rule of law, both on divine and domestic 
measures.12 With the law a “multivalent repository of a ruling group’s values, along with the 
formalized (and state sanctioned) methods of social control used to discourage or punish 
behavior,” the legal system largely determines the moral, political and social limitations of 
society. WBC believes that the law of the land should fall into line with the law of God, and 
when the two diverge, God becomes furious. Therefore, laws benefiting homosexuals directly 
rouse God’s vengeance. Referring to the 2003 Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas, the WBC 
states “America crossed the line on June 26 2003, when the Supreme Court (the conscience of 
the nation) ruled we must respect sodomy,” with the Lawrence case standing at the pinnacle of 
the group’s outrage.13 Many of the church members are practicing lawyers, providing the group 
with an unusually well-versed understanding of First Amendment legal protections. As 
previously stated, Westboro’s picketing takes extra precaution in remaining within the bounds of 
legality. Despite laws passed in response to their protests (such as the Respect for America’s 
Fallen Heroes Act), Westboro have used their legal savvy to win several court cases—most 
significantly, Snyder v. Phelps. 
The WBC’s political tactics pose a legislative challenge in terms of free speech 
regulation, with the church’s provocative approach warranting an outcry from the general public 
and politicians eager to check them accordingly. Through violating the space of the sacred (i.e. 
                                               
12 Baker, Joseph O., Bader, Christopher D., Hirsch, Kristen, Desecration, Moral Boundaries, and 
the Movement of Law, 57 
13 Westboro Baptist Church, “About WBC”, godhatesfags.com, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (accessed 11/20/17) 
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funerals, flag desecrations, etc.) Westboro pushes the boundaries of traditional American moral 
order. Their protests thus “extend beyond simply disrespecting” into “rhetorically violat(ing) the 
sanctity of funerary rites in efforts to defile the deepest signifiers of civil religion—soldiers’ dead 
bodies.”14 Additionally, their invocation of God as a force of hatred, one specifically targeting 
the homosexual community, raises particular ire over their usage and claims of God’s will. 
Westboro initially targeted the burials of those who had died from AIDS, claiming that they were 
decrying the deceased’s sexual immorality and lauding their subsequent punishment by God. 
They also protested pro-LBGTQ events such as pride festivals. Following in the same 
homophobic vein, the WBC garnered significant media attention following the picketing of 
Matthew Shephard’s funeral in 1998. However, the group gained more mainstream notoriety and 
coverage following their 2005 protest of an American soldier’s funeral. The WBC’s purpose for 
picketing military funerals doesn’t stem from specific anti-U.S. military stance, but rather serves 
as an extension for their anti-homosexual agenda. The group fervently believes that each troop’s 
death results from America’s growing acceptance of the LGBTQ community. Concerning their 
military protests, Westboro’s website states “Perceiving the modern militant homosexual 
movement to pose a clear and present danger to the survival of America, exposing our nation to 
the wrath of God as in 1898 B.C. at Sodom and Gomorrah, WBC has conducted 60,752 such 
demonstrations since June, 1991, at homosexual parades and other events, including funerals of 
impenitent sodomites (like Matthew Shepard) and over 400 military funerals of troops whom 
God has killed in Iraq/Afghanistan in righteous judgment against an evil nation.”15 Thus, their 
                                               
14 Baker, Joseph O., Bader, Christopher D., Hirsch, Kristen, Desecration, Moral Boundaries, and 
the Movement of Law, 46 
15 Westboro Baptist Church, “About WBC”, godhatesfags.com, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (accessed 11/20/17) 
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military protests are directly linked to their fundamentalist, homophobic belief system. The 
group is also vehemently anti-Catholic, making Matthew Snyder—Catholic, American, and a 
Marine—an ideal target.  
 
Snyder v. Phelps 
Snyder v. Phelps originated with the death of twenty-year-old Marine Lance Cpl. 
Matthew A. Snyder, killed in an accident while serving in Iraq.16 On the date of the burial, 
March 10th, 2006, Rev. Phelps and seven other WBC family members travelled to Westminster, 
Maryland to protest the funeral. Coordinating and cooperating fully with the police, the local 
department escorted Westboro to the picket site—a 10 x 25-foot plot of land surrounded by 
orange fences, located about 1,000 feet away from the church entrance.17 Westboro remained 
within their designated protest site, displaying their signs and singing hymns. No profanity was 
verbally articulated; however, their placards included statements such as “God Hates the USA”, 
“Fag Troops”, “America is doomed”, and “Pope in Hell”.  Signs more specifically targeting the 
deceased Cpl. Snyder included “You’re going to hell”, “God Hates You”, “Semper fi fags”, and 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers”.18  The homophobic slurs mischaracterized the heterosexual 
Matthew Snyder—however, the accuracy of their statements was irrelevant to the overarching 
purpose of Westboro’s protest. While the Snyder family later stated that they could not see the 
full content of the signs from their church vantage point, father Al Snyder said he was able to 
glimpse the tops of the signs. He wasn’t aware that the protest was directed towards his son. 
                                               
16 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
17 Russomanno, Joseph, “’Freedom for the Thought That We Hate’: Why Westboro Had to 
Win”, Communication Law and Policy, (2012): 2 
18 Ibid., 3 
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Snyder later discovered the full extent of the signs’ content that night while watching the local 
news. He also discovered a blogpost on the WBC website specifically addressing his son’s 
funeral—a so-called “Epic” entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder”. 
Excerpts from the “Epic” include passages directly focused on Matthew Snyder and his family, 
referring to them by name: 
 “Twenty years ago, little Matthew Snyder came into the world…God created him and 
loaned/entrusted him to Albert and Julie Snyder,” with the “Epic” continuing to state that Cpl. 
Snyder’s parents “had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD—PERIOD! 
You did JUST THE OPPOSITE—you raised him for the devil. You taught him that God was a 
liar.”19  
Three months later, in June of 2006, Al Snyder filed a suit against the adult members in 
attendance at his son’s funeral protest and against the church itself. Snyder cited four state law 
tort claims: defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and conspiracy.20 Snyder’s claims originated from his position as a private citizen; his claims 
were therefore “grounded in an implicit theory of the private sphere….that a human being’s 
private suffering and grief should not be used in a mercenary fashion as a public platform for 
religious or political grandstanding by another party.”21 The WBC had violated both his and his 
son’s right to privacy. Additionally, they had defamed his son and caused intentional emotional 
distress. During the trial, Snyder presented evidence of physical and mental distress as caused by 
                                               
19 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)  
20 Rossamunno, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 3 
21 Bruner, M. Lane, Balter-Reitz, Susan “Snyder v. Phelps: The Supreme Court’s Spectacular 
Erasure of the Tragic Spectacle” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, Vol. 16, Winter 2013): 660 
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the WBC’s protest—including a serious worsening of his diabetes and a deepening depression. 
The post-trial opinion, assessing Snyder, states: 
“He described the severity of his emotional injury, stating that is often tearful and angry, 
and that he becomes so sick to his stomach that he actually physically vomits. He testified that 
the Defendants placed a “bug in his head, such that he is unable to separate thoughts of his son 
from the [Defendants’] actions.” 
 
In response, Phelps and his family cited protection from tort liability under the First Amendment, 
specifically the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort (IIED).  The WBC claimed that 
Matthew Snyder’s funeral was a public event due to its announcement in a local paper—and 
thus, Matthew and his father should be treated as public figures. Phelps argued that the 
importance of the WBC’s contribution to public debate dwarfed the Snyder’ right to privacy.  
 The preliminary district trial court held Westboro liable for all but one of Snyder’s tort 
claims, with the expectation of his defamation claim. Snyder was initially awarded over $10 
million in total, which was later lowered by the district judge to $5 million through remission of 
punitive damages.22 But upon Phelps appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the verdict on the basis 
of Fred Phelps’s free speech claims, holding that his claims “failed as a matter of First 
Amendment law” due to how “the defendants were expressing views on matters of public 
concern and did not seriously assert anything provably false about Snyder or his son.”23 Despite 
the court’s statements that Westboro’s words were “distasteful and repugnant”, the Fourth 
                                               
22 United States Courts, “Facts and Case Summary: Snyder v. Phelps”, www.uscourts.gov, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-
snyder-v-phelps, accessed 11/25/17 
23 Zipursky, Benjamin C., “Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort 
Law”, DePaul Law 60, Issue 2 (Winter 2011): 474 
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Circuit held they were “constrained to conclude that Defendants’ signs and Epic are 
constitutionally protected.”24 Hence, Westboro’s words didn’t fall under the category of hate 
speech, and the Snyder family was not protected under the IIED tort. The court based its 8 to 1 
decision on the basis of public concern, determining that Westboro’s speech involved public 
issues—and was therefore constitutionally protected. With most of the court’s decision stemming 
from scrutiny of the Epic and the picket signs, it was based on the conjecture of so-called 
“reasonable people. This assumption held that observers of the protest could reasonably infer that 
Westboro’s statements were rhetorical and weren’t directed toward Matthew Shepherd as an 
individual. Since the protest took place in on a public street, the court drew that it was exempt 
from IIED liability. Accordingly, the Snyder family’s emotional damage was just an unfortunate 
footnote in a religious organization’s legitimate practice of free speech. With the Fourth Circuit 
noting that rhetorical hyperbole (such as WBC’s “God Hates Fags”) is “entitled to First 
Amendment protections” in order “to ensure that public debate will not suffer to lack of 
imagination”,25 the court inferred that public debate takes priority over individual’s potential 
emotional harm. By being deemed a public figure subject to public debate, Albert’s Snyder’s 
emotional distress at Westboro’s protest—as well as his family’s dignity-- fell second to Fred 
Phelps’s Constitutional right to free speech.  
 
Dissenting Opinion  
Justice Alito stood as the only dissenting judge in an 8 to 1 decision. Much of his dissent 
concerned Westboro’s misuse of their freedom of expression at the expense of the Snyder’s 
                                               
24 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
25 Bruner, M. Lane, Balter-Reitz, Susan, citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011): 665 
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dignity. In his closing statement, Alito states that “our profound national commitment to free and 
open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in (the Snyder v. Phelps) 
case,” due largely to his belief that Albert Snyder’s possessed the status of private figure, not a 
public one.26 Snyder was performing the ordinary rites of burial and attempting to bury his son, 
an essentially private act. He did not possess status of celebrity nor was he a public figurehead. 
And despite the WBC’s protection under the First Amendment allowing them to convey their 
viewpoint, Alito argues that they were restricted in making attacks which lacked contribution to 
public debate. Citing the tort law permitting recovery for intentional emotional distress (with 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell as standing) precedent, Alito claims that WBC’s attacks met 
the standards for a IIED claim. Their attacks on Snyder and his family were of a specific and 
intimate nature. So, despite the rigidity of the tort’s limitations, the WBC’s personal attacks on 
the deceased Snyder—done with the intent to cause serious and lasting harm—warrants the 
Snyders’ protection under the tort. He positions that the WBC’s overall aim was not to contribute 
to public debate, but to personally attack the deceased Cpl. Snyder and his family. Alito invoked 
both the WBC’s picket signs and online rant as evidence.  Although the court found that 
“reasonable people” would find Westboro’s statements and protest to be rhetorical, Alito stated 
that since the WBC “chose to stage their protest at Matthew Snyder’s funeral and not at any of 
the other countless available venues” a so-called “reasonable person would have “assumed there 
was a connection between the message on the placards and the deceased.”27 With the placards 
designating God’s judgement of the deceased and homosexuality, a “reasonable bystander seeing 
those signs would have likely concluded that they were meant to suggest the deceased was a 
                                               
26 Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/09-751.ZD.html, accessed 1/10/18 
27 Alito, J, dissenting 
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homosexual”, albeit a homosexual burning in hell.28  Thus, the WBC’s presence nearby the 
funeral—even though legally sanctioned—in conjunction with their placard’s contents warrants a 
personal attack on Matthew Snyder. Furthermore, the church’s online “epic” further clarified 
their hateful position on homosexuality, the United States military, and specifically Matthew 
Snyder’s personhood. Alito maintains that the WBC’s attacks on Snyder’s personhood, on the 
basis of his Catholic religion and military service, is not a matter of public debate. Rather, it was 
a targeted and intentional effort to cause individuals severe emotional pain. In regard to the 
WBC’s protection under the First Amendment, Alito states that it “allows recovery for 
defamatory statements that are interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public 
concern, and there is no good reason why respondents’ attack on Matthew Snyder and his family 
should be treated differently.”29 So even if a portion of WBC’s speech involved public debate, it 
doesn’t hold that the rest of their speech shouldn’t be subject to IIED prosecution. Alito 
concludes with acknowledging the conduct of the WBC was outrageous, causing Snyder great 
personal harms—and by siding with Phelps’s claims, the Supreme Court only deepened the 
family’s injuries.  
 
The American Approach to Free Speech 
Understanding the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps requires a consideration 
of the uniquely American approach to freedom of expression. The American legal system places 
particular emphasis on the importance of free speech, with the First Amendment oft-prioritized 
before all other rights. With the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution stating that “Congress 
                                               
28 Alito, J, dissenting 
29 Alito, J, dissenting  
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shall make no laws... abridging the freedom of speech”, the First Amendment has emerged as the 
most crucial aspect of American governance. Foreshadowing some aspects of the UDHR’s 
philosophy, the American Constitution draws heavily from John Locke’s theory of natural rights, 
as well as 17th and 18th century social contract theories. The natural rights theory, also prevalent 
in the Bill of Rights, grants that each individual is born with inherent rights, and such rights 
ought to be protected and fostered by the state. The individual, through living in the state, enters 
into a contract with the government—exchanging certain freedoms for certain securities. The 
individual prepossesses natural rights when they enter the contract, while the rights granted by 
the contract (in this case, the Constitution) are deemed to be contractual rights. Both act in 
tandem to provide a conception of liberty and to protect the aforementioned rights granted.  
However, certain American judicial evolutions and precedents have seemingly come to 
value some rights—mainly the right to expression—over others, such as the right to dignity. In 
accordance with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who called for “freedom for the thought we 
hate”, the Supreme Court has established a radical acceptance of free speech as determined by 
the supreme law of the land. And as demonstrated by the decision of the Fourth District in 
Snyder v. Phelps, American jurisdiction prioritizes the right to expression above all other 
freedoms.30 
 America’s approach to freedom of speech is a complex one, changing with each court 
based precedent set by the judicial system. It serves to protect nonpolitical expression as well as 
protect art and music. All expressed ideals possessing any degree of social relevance—no matter 
how controversial—is safeguarded under the First Amendment. There has historically been a 
strong judicial resistance to any sort of content regulation, with the basis being that no idea 
                                               
30 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
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should be ascribed more value over another.31 Perspectives which differ from each other, no 
matter how radically so, each possess the same intrinsic value (and thus, protection) under the 
law. This also applies to cases of symbolic speech i.e. destroying draft cards, flag burning or 
wearing swastikas. However, this protection does not extend to cases deemed as obscenity, 
fighting words, defamation, and incitement. An example of the former is the 1957 Supreme 
Court case Roth v. United States. Samuel Roth was convinced of the publication and distribution 
of obscene materials in his bookstore. Some of his store’s stock contained pornographic images, 
with his print advertising for the products stating as such. In its conclusion of the case, the court 
stated that: 
 
“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, 
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full 
protection of the (constitutional) guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the 
limited area of more important interests; but implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the 
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social interest.”32  
 
Thus, obscene speech is not a constitutionally protected form of expression. Nonetheless, the 
dividing line between obscenity and acceptable speech remains a fuzzy one. In the Roth case, the 
court stated that obscenity must be “taken as a whole” with accountability for the “dominant 
theme of the material.”33 This allows for a rather broad and liberal definition of the term. If 
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obscenity is judged on the basis of the whole material, then no singular part can be a total 
indicator. Therefore, no one image or passage can jump the line into obscenity—the work must 
be tried based on the entirety of the text.  
 But even though there are aspects of expression that aren’t protected under the First 
Amendment, regulations of problematic speech may still not be permissible. In the case of R.A.V. 
vs. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court struck down the state’s ordinance against hate speech. 
The case concerned a cross burning on an African-American family’s lawn, with petitioner, 
R.A.V. charged under St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. The ordinance stated  
“whoever place on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, character or graffiti, 
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”34 
While the trial court granted R.A.V. that the ordinance was too far reaching and content based, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision. Citing prior Minnesotan cases, the court 
deemed that the actions of R.A.V. amounted to fighting words as per conduct which “arouse(s) 
anger, alarm or resentment,” which cross burning on private property entails. The Minnesotan 
court in turn argued that the ordinance only applied to speech beyond First Amendment 
protections. Upon review by the Supreme Court, the ordinance was found to be facially 
unconstitutional—the reason being that “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the 
basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”35 Following as such, the St. Paul ordnance was 
overturned on the grounds of inappropriate content regulation.  
                                               
34 St. Paul Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990) 
35 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul (90-7675), 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
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As demonstrated, even areas of speech which are not explicitly covered by the First 
Amendment enjoy a certain degree of protection from content prohibition. In the words of the 
court, “the exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from the scope of the First Amendments simply means 
that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are, despite their 
verbal character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element of communication.”36 With the Supreme 
Court claiming that fighting words are analogous to a “noisy truck,” the focus shifts from the 
medium of communication to the actual message. While the medium may be irritating, 
disruptive, or even offensive, the message nonetheless continues to carry relevance in terms of 
freedom of expression. The landmark decision reached in R.A.V. vs. St. Paul reflected this, with 
the St. Paul ordinance deemed unconstitutional on the basis of viewpoint discrimination. Even in 
cases of obscenity, defamation and fighting words, the government is not allowed to regulate 
such speech based upon either hostility or favoritism.37 However, defining such terms—as well 
as separating the message from the medium—isn’t always cut and dry. 
 This reluctance to engage in content regulation can clearly be seen in Snyder v. Phelps. 
Even though Westboro’s protest could be deemed obscene (with homophobic slurs in a public 
setting) or defamatory (false and offensive attacks on a potential private citizen), the Court found 
that the First Amendment protected the WBC’s right to convey their viewpoint.38 Although the 
medium of them picketing a funeral was blatantly controversial and offensive, the content of 
their speech still deserved acknowledgement. Such speech could not be constitutionally denied. 
This withstanding, the WBC intentionally chooses places and targets that will gander the most 
outraged reactions. More outrage from the pubic attracts more media coverage. Consequently, 
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more attention furthers the WBC’s goal of serving as God’s mouthpiece. This methodology 
raises questions concerning valuing the message over the medium—particularly in the context of 
funeral rites and intense media exposure. Although dissenting Justice Alito argued that the 
Snyders were private, not public citizens, Westboro’s protest was via a public medium. This 
publicity factored into the court’s decision to eliminate the Snyders from protection under the 
IIED tort law, since it was deemed to be public debate. The open medium of Westboro’s attack 
further contributed to the harm inflicted upon the Snyders, as noted by Albert Snyder in his court 
statement. The public decimation of their recently deceased son by the WBC—as covered by the 
news media and further elaborated upon in the online rant—infringed on both privacy and 
reputation. Furthermore, the aggressive nature of the speech made heavily negative and false 
implications regarding Matthew Snyder’s sexual life, as well as status in the afterlife. WBC’s 
false implications became open for public consumption. Moreover, the medium of the message 
included profoundly offensive slurs against homosexuals. Signs such as “God Hates Fags”, 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “Semper Fi Fags” target specific at-risk demographics. 
Displayed in a public forum, the placards are extremely discriminatory against both LGBTQ 
peoples and members of the military. As the LGBTQ community is already subject to major 
discrimination in much of American society, these public attacks intensify preexisting negative 
societal hierarchies. The WBC’s methods of conveyance drive their campaign to gain media 
exposure, with the medium further amplifying the group’s message. Despite being legally 
protected, such speech mediums serve to deepen the harm caused by the WBC’s attacks. This 
loophole in speech laws demonstrates one of the flaws in America’s lack of content regulating 
prohibitions. Though the lack of regulations, Westboro is legally allowed to spread 
misinformation and inflict lasting emotional harm. 
 20 
 
America’s Hate Speech and Harms 
 America’s approach to hate speech is a complex one, differing from international law 
standards. As demonstrated by both the R.A.V. vs. St. Paul and the Snyder v. Phelps outcomes, 
the American definition of “hate speech” isn’t—as European counterparts are—content based. Its 
basis in indictment allows for hate groups to prosper without negative legal implications. The 
US’s understanding of hate speech sanctions a multitude of loopholes, in which the judicial 
definition of the term is dangerously flexible. 
According to Sarah Sorial, hate speech is: 
 
“a broad term used to describe speech which attacks others on the grounds of their race, 
nationality, religious identity, gender, sexual orientation or other group memberships, where this 
group membership is a morally arbitrary distinguishing feature.”39 
 
Through expressing notions of another’s inferiority based on them belonging to a certain social 
order or class, such verbal expressions engage in an emblematic, prejudicial attacks. Under 
Soral’s definition, hate speech includes slurs, defamation, and verbal harassment. Hate speech 
can also include broad, all-encompassing statements such as “All Muslims are Terrorists” or 
displays of well-known symbols of hate, such as swastikas.40 It might seem that the WBC, with 
their placards proclaiming that “God Hates Fags” among other homophobic sentiments, routinely 
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engages in hate speech. However, the American legal boundaries of present a much more 
convoluted picture—one which oft-runs contrary to the human rights-based laws valuing human 
dignity for all right bearers.  
 Hate speech involves the othering of another group or individual, an attempt to reduce 
one’s inclusivity within a broader social context. It is a form of speech that goes beyond insult, 
sending a message that “members of a particular minority or peripheral group should not get too 
comfortable because many other(s) would gladly mistreat them or cast them out.”41 Instances of 
hate speech diminish one’s status as a fellow human being. Since in a functioning democracy all 
beings are entitled to equal protections under the law, hate speech—and acceptance of hate 
speech on a federal or judicial level—violates such notions of state sanctioned equality. Harmful 
speech reduces the equal status of one’s fellow citizens, as well as raises the potential for direct 
acts of violence. Even when not directly advocating for harm, it creates a toxic environment 
prime for cultivating festering resentments.  
In order to combat hate speech, there must be a suitable definition of the term. In this 
regard, America is lacking. As free speech is crucial for a functioning democracy, First 
Amendment protections are especially legally robust when it comes to defining hate speech—as 
demonstrated by cases such as National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie (1977), Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell (1988) and the aforementioned R.A.V. vs. St. Paul.42 In each of these cases, 
the Supreme Court ruled to protect the free speech of the defendants. As to maximize protection 
of freedom of speech, legal categorization of hate speech rests primarily upon determination of 
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incitement. If speech is thought to have been expressed in order to stir up lawless violence 
against a person, group, or creed, then it can be legally defined as hate speech—with the term 
“incitement” serving as an umbrella to protect more general forms of speech. Defining hate 
speech as incitement therefore “ensures speech is more generally protected because the law does 
not capture the actual content of the speech, only the ‘inciting matter’ in which it is expressed.”43 
Such a categorization grants the ability to dodge any content-based prohibitions on speech. 
Instead, focus is granted to the medium in which the message was conveyed instead of the 
message itself. Therefore, the HOW of what was spoken takes precedence over WHAT was 
spoken. However, as mentioned prior, the medium can do lasting harm to targets alongside the 
message.  
The limitations of incitement, as demonstrated by Snyder v. Phelps, are extremely 
variable. Prior free speech cases demonstrate the Supreme Court’s approach. One legal course 
for determination is referred to as the Brandenburg Test, named after Brandenbrug v. Ohio 
(1969). The test sets a certain—although not comprehensive-- precedent for determining the 
bounds of inflammatory speech. The Supreme Court case involved a KKK leader who, during a 
private rally and in front of reporters, spoke at length using racial slurs.44 Addressing his fellow 
KKK members, he stated: “it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance (sic) 
taken” against minority groups.45 Upon the video’s surfacing, the Klan leader was convicted 
under Ohio state law. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and ruled in 
favor of the Klansman’s right to free speech. Expression may be prohibited on two counts—
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firstly, if the speech is “directed to inciting or producing violence”, or secondly if the speech is 
“likely to incite or produce such action.”46 Since the KKK leader was practicing “mere 
advocacy” of violence instead of straight “incitement to imminent lawless action,” the Court 
concluded that his speech was protected.47 The Brandenburg Test became further specified in 
1973 Supreme Court case Hess v. Indiana. The Court concluded that incitement is determined by 
the likeliness to produce impending violence. Their ruling concerning the reversal of Hess’s 
conviction stated, “since there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of 
language, that [the speaker’s] words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent 
disorder, these words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had a ‘tendency 
to lead to violence.’”48 In order for speech to count as incitement, it must be determined that the 
words were intended to provoke violence—in accordance to the notion of time in relation to the 
incurred threat. Therefore, with the great value placed on the First Amendment by America’s 
judicial system, the Brandenburg Test allows for some—however vague—determination of the 
nature of harmful speech. Brandenburg Test withstanding, incitement-based standards do not do 
enough to properly account for speakers well-versed in law. The test provides too wide of a net 
for what doesn’t constitute incitement as opposed to what does. Additionally, it only accounts for 
immediate violence. While Westboro may not be calling for physical attacks on their targets, 
their relentless protesting tactics work to create an abiding hostile atmosphere. This also applies 
to other active hate groups. Later Supreme Court cases ruled in favor of unsavory characters such 
as Nazis (Collins v. Smith) and other racists (R.A.V. vs. City of St. Paul). 
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Limitations of Hate Speech Definitions  
Two issues arise from such a categorization of hate speech and incitement as based upon 
the merits of the speech’s medium. The first comes from potential misemployment of 
punishment, as directed by lack of education or other needed abilities for expression.49 Since hate 
speech laws targeting the “how” of what is conveyed via speech, those possessing a better 
understanding of the law are able to skirt around limitations. Whereas people who engage in 
“histrionic or hyperbolic ranting” can be more easily called out, speakers who are able to “couch 
their claims in ways that seems acceptable” avoid legal ramifications and are permitted to spread 
their message.50 In cases of this sort, indictment laws unfairly target those lacking in education, 
or speakers with other expressional limitations. Secondly and conversely, the same indictment 
laws do not do enough in terms of limiting speakers with deeper understandings of legislative 
limitations. The Westboro Baptist Church stands as a leading example of such speakers. With a 
team of lawyers at the helm of the organization, the WBC is meticulous in staying within legal 
good graces. Savvy hate groups possessing a knowledge of the law are able to amend their 
language, avoiding being ensnared by legislation. As long as their language falls within the realm 
of the civil—as to avoid obscenities or fighting words charges—hate groups are able to sidestep 
technically being classified as such. This also applies to the protest tactics of the WBC. The 
church takes care to cover all their legal bases, both in terms of their conduct and cooperating 
with local law enforcement. For other less obvious hate groups, the subtler conveyance of their 
message (alongside the lack of prohibitory legislation) makes their dispatches more palpable for 
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larger audiences.51 By avoiding more obvious, openly aggressive uses of slurs and instead opting 
for use of more widely accepted language, hate groups (such as alt-right organizations) can gain 
better access into the mainstream. Although the Westboro Baptist Church routinely engages in 
slurs (prominently of the homophobic variety), their deep reservoir of legal knowledge sanctions 
the group’s protection under the First Amendment. Their awareness of the ins and outs of free 
speech legislation, as well as protest laws, allows for the group to survive and even thrive under 
media attention.  
Relying primarily on incitement of violence as a definition of hate speech allows for 
incorrect categorizations of the term. Despite its vitriol, the Forth District classified Westboro’s 
speech as public debate. Although it caused the Snyder family mental and physical distress, the 
WBC’s protest was deemed to contribute to the democratic marketplace of ideas—even though 
their protest was intended to promote unjust and unequal ideas of hate. The WBC’s legal 
capabilities allowed them to misuse the American approach to freedom of expression to their 
own advantage, resulting in what Soral refers to as “distorted communication.” Westboro 
exploited their speech protections in order to “argue for an undemocratic social and political 
organization, which would exclude others from equal recognition and participation.”52 Their 
engagement of demeaning speech towards both individuals (Matthew Snyder and his family) and 
groups (homosexuals, Catholics, etc.) “exclude(s) others from equal participation in various 
subtle and overt ways, including by making others feel threatened and cultivating an 
environment that is degrading, hostile, or uncomfortable for the hearer.”53 With their relentless 
cross country touring schedule and relationship with the media, the WBC have become an 
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infamous part of the American lexicon. Their prominence, however derided by the general 
public, contributes to a creating a toxic social atmosphere of discrimination. Through distorted 
communication, Westboro manipulates the boundaries of legal definitions of free speech and 
hate speech. As such, incitement as a legal basis doesn’t cover all the necessary bases.  
 
Hateful Public Debate in the Marketplace of Ideas  
One of the main justifications for radical American free speech is the so-called 
“marketplace of ideas” theory. The WBC’s personal attacks on Cpl. Snyder, as well as its use of 
slurs, occurred in a public forum. The Court concluded that to limit their speech would to limit 
public debate. This view had its basis in the concept of the marketplace of ideas—that in order to 
have robust public debate, all ideas must be considered.54 Theoretically, the best ideas in the 
public realm would rise to prominence, as dictated by the marketplace. This had judicial 
precedence in Abrams v. United States, with Supreme Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes 
stating that “the best truth of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted by the 
competition of the market.”55 However, individual’s and groups’ confirmation bias must be taken 
into account. People often base their decisions and judgements in ways serving prior existing 
beliefs. Accordingly, individuals and groups are more likely to buy into those ideas which further 
their own interests, as opposed to what may truly be the best idea.56 What rises to the top in the 
marketplace of ideas may—especially in a less than perfect democracy—serve to better a party at 
the expense of another party. In terms of hate speech, if the majority decides on a course of 
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action which violates a minority’s rights, it wouldn’t be the so-called “best idea”. It would 
merely be the idea which best served to further the interests of a particular party. Confirmation 
bias also drives people to seek out ideas which confirm their own preexisting belief system. In 
the case of Snyder v. Phelps, their contribution to the “marketplace of ideas” is heavily steeped in 
homophobia. If one subscribes to a homophobic ideology, they’re more likely to buy into the 
WBC’s protests—and thus feel justified in their own homophobic sentiments. However, the 
United States’ lack of content restriction legislation makes it near-impossible to regulate the 
marketplace of ideas. While democracy relies on the free flow of communication, 
communication denying another’s personhood undermines the democratic process. The natural 
rights-based democracy theory is based in recognizing the humanity within others. When an idea 
is based in discriminatory ideology, reliance on “the marketplace of ideas” weakens the ability of 
all parties to equally participate. Consequently, the theory ultimately runs against international 
law’s stipulations of free speech. 
 
International Law and Expression 
While recognizing freedom of speech as fundamental to the human condition, 
international law provides a more comprehensive approach to hate speech. Whereas other 
western nations—such as South Africa, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and other EU 
countries—have all signed and ratified international human rights covenants concerning hate 
speech, the United States has dodged any such commitments to soft or hard law. Even in regard 
to major treaties such as the ICCPR 
There is no other country that has made more reservations, understandings, and 
declarations (“RUDs”) in their agreement than the United States. The international model of 
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speech seeks to, as in a rights-based paradigm, preserve freedom of speech while not infringing 
on other rights. In contrast to the United States, some international law treaties go as far as to 
require states to ban speech that is deemed to incite hatred or promote inequality. Within abiding 
states, hate groups have less recourse for infringing on others’ dignity. In its effort to preserve 
Constitutionally based free speech, the United States fails to uphold the standards of the 
international community. The development of international law’s stance on free speech reflects 
the its growing emphasis on rights being interdependently linked to the concept of human value. 
Instead of there being one right valued over all, i.e. American speech, international law holds 
dignity as an objective. Human rights treaties theoretically work to ensure that no being or group 
is discriminated against. Since hate speech violates dignity, it is a form of discrimination. There 
are several key articles providing a baseline for the determination of hate speech, providing a 
contrast to the United States’ solely incitement-based approach. 
International laws counterbalancing freedom of expression with limiting hate speech stem 
from the United Nations, an international organization consisting of over 200 nation-states. The 
UN’s purpose is to primarily promote and protect human rights worldwide, with its Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) majorly influencing the international community’s 
approach to human rights. Drawn up in the aftermath of WWII, the declaration was the first 
collation of efforts to establish a rights-based basis for international law. The UDHR, alongside 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), lays the much of the 
groundwork for modern rights paradigms. While Article 19 of the UDHR states that “everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression…includ(ing) the freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media 
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and regardless of frontiers”, this is not an absolute right.57 Even though there’s no explicit 
mention of hate speech prohibitions, Article 7 provides a counterbalance to Article 19, stating 
that “all are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration 
and against any incitement to such discrimination.”58 Additionally, Article 29 of the UDHR set 
limitations on granted rights, stating in 29(2) that “everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”59This is further elaborated on in 
the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), which became the first UN treaty to deal with hate speech. Article of the CERD urges 
all state parties to “condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or 
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred or discrimination in any form.”60 The convention 
continues to declare that states are obligated to “undertake to adopt immediate and positive 
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination,” with parties 
required to punish by law all dissemination of ideas related to racial discrimination. This also 
covers acts deemed to be incitement.61  
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CERD provided the groundwork for the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)—the covenant perhaps exerting the most influence on contemporary 
international law’s approach to hate speech.62 As its name implies, the ICCPR guarantees a broad 
spectrum of second generation civil and political rights. The covenant is “rooted in basic 
democratic values and freedoms, to all individuals within the territory to under the jurisdiction of 
the States party without distinction of any kind, such as race, gender, ethnicity, et cetera” with 
parties obligated to respect and ensure these rights, to adopt legislative or other necessary 
messages to give effect to these rights, and to provide an effective remedy to those whose rights 
are violated.”63 The ICCPR grants negative and positive rights, including the right to self-
determination and freedom of opinion. It also grants freedom from advocacy of national, racial 
or religious hatred. In this regard, the two relevant ICCPR articles are Articles 19 and 20. Article 
19(2) guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the rights to “seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”64 However, these rights are 
not absolute. Article 19(3) provides a caveat to the prior paragraph, stating that the “exercise of 
rights (provided in 19(2)) …carries with it special duties and responsibilities.”65 As follows, 
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR “may therefore be subject to certain restrictions” but only when 
judicially sanctioned and necessary.66 Even with this caveat, the following covenant article, 
Article 20, becomes a potential source of tension in regard to free speech. Article 20(1) declares 
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that any propaganda advocating war shall be prohibited by law, with 20(2) stating that “any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by law.”67 Even though Article 20(2) serves to restrict 
certain forms of speech, it was written as to be compatible with the prior article. If a state’s law 
wishes to invoke the boundaries of 20(2), it must also be in accordance with Article 19(3). This 
is also applicable vice versa, with states wanting to invoke Article 19(3) having to stay within the 
scope of 20(2). However, it is theoretically possible for Article 19(3) to work to restrict hate 
speech beyond 20(2)’s requirements, as “what States are required to ban to ensure equality is not 
necessarily the same as what they are permitted to ban to serve this goal without breaching the 
right to freedom of expression.”68 In other words, States can still, hypothetically, respect Article 
19(3) while working to limit certain forms of incitement.   
Even though the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 -- twenty-six years after its 
adoption by the United Nation’s General Assembly --the state proposed a huge number of RUDs. 
They included provisions to prohibition of capital punishment, war propaganda, cruel, and 
inhuman or degrading treatment, and equal protection.69 The United States’ reservation to Article 
20 is the most significant in regard to the state’s stance on freedom of speech preservation. With 
concerns the Article would infringe on First Amendment protections, the Senate issued a 
reservation that “Article 20 does not…restrict the right of free speech and association protected 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”70 Citing Constitutional freedoms, the US 
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made an additional reservation to ICCPR’s Article 19-- specifically, 19(3a) and 3(b). Both 
articles call for restrictions on exercising freedom of expression “for the respect of the rights or 
reputations of others” or “for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public 
health or morals.”71 The United States avowed that they would not accept these limitations, and 
rather continue to pursue their Constitutional approach. Stating their reservations, the Senate 
only consented to the ICCPR on the basis that “the constitution and laws of the United States 
contain extensive protections of its individual freedom of speech, expression and association,” 
and as such “the United States does not accept and obligation under this Convention…to restrict 
those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to the extent that they are 
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”72 Although RUDs to international 
covenants are far from uncommon, the US avoided any obligation to speech restrictions of any 
kind. No other nation state made more reservations to the treaty, particularly in regard to 
freedom of expression. Consequently, the US is not obligated to halt hate speech under any 
human rights treaty. This demonstrates the United States’ radical departure from human rights 
norms, often—in the case of the Snyder family—at the expense of state’s right bearers.  
In international law, there are two main foundations regarding what constitutes hate 
speech—namely, incitement, and proscribed results (such as hatred against a group). Within the 
context of hate speech, incitement is defined as a desire to promote violence, racism, 
discrimination or hatred. This is opposed to the US’s definition under the Brandenburg Test. As 
mentioned prior, although the UDHR does not mention regulations on speech, regulating intent 
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is explicitly mentioned in Article 20(2) of the ICCPR. And even though international law lacks a 
concrete definition of the term, there are a number of factors which help dictate a general 
understanding. While it generally follows that causation is not the same as incitement, the 
causation can serve as an indicator of provocation. The impact of the speech—on both the targets 
and the overall environment—should be taken into account. In Canadian Supreme Court case 
Malcom Ross v. Canada, a New Brunswick remedial reading teacher (Ross) stood accused of 
propagating anti-Semitic views. The Canadian Supreme court concluded that the “evidence that a 
‘poisoned environment’ had been created within the relevant school board and held that ‘it is 
possible to reasonably anticipate’ the causal relationship between that environment and the 
author’s publications.”73 When the case came before the Human Rights Committee, the HRC 
held that this counted as incitement—and therefore did not violate Ross’s right to freedom of 
expression. Thus, the risk of potential harm, as well as the creation of the “poisoned 
environment” within the school constituted hate speech. 
Context is a crucial factor in the human rights appraisal of incitement. In the Ross case, 
Ross’s standing as a teacher heavily influenced the HRC’s upholding of the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s decision. As mentioned in the Committee’s briefing of the case, “in the circumstances, 
the Committee recalls that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities…(which) are of particular relevance within the school system, 
especially in regard to the teaching of young students.”74 Since Ross was in a position of relative 
power, he was regarded by the HRC to have more influence in spreading (mis)information. As 
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thus, his role as teacher was an important factor in determining context and therefore setting the 
stage for incitement. Taking context into account serves to measure the likelihood of a sort of 
environmental combustion, especially when it leads to negative proscribed results. Article 4(a) of 
the CERD and ICCPR’s Article 20(2) reach past covering merely incitement to violence. Both 
articles call for prohibitions on incitement to hatred and discrimination, with CERD’s Article 
4(a) additional “declar(ing) an offence punishing by law all dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority.”75 While incitement to violence is deemed to be hate speech even by American 
standards, prohibitions on incitement to hatred constitutes another approach. Rather than calling 
for a specific act, incitement to hatred is a creation of a state of mind.76 Hatred is a viewpoint and 
thus covered under international law’s freedom of expression norms—but yet, most states (with a 
few notable expectations, most prominently the United States) accept the banning of incitement 
to hatred. The justification of the ban draws upon the probable physical manifestation of hatred, 
from thought to action. Since hatred is a powerful, driving state of mind, some form of it will 
eventually develop into tangible being. Thus, the ban works to protect groups before they need to 
seek protection from acts of hatred. The HRC’s definition of hatred relies on the potential 
discrimination to a group (i.e. racism), or the risk of harm to established rights. In terms of 
Westboro, it can be argued that the group engaged in incitement to hatred—though invoking God 
as justification for discrimination. 
Primarily, the difference between international definitions of hate speech and merely 
offensive speech lies in the target. If the expression’s target is an idea, then it is covered by 
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freedom of expression protections. However, if the target is a human being, the expression may 
not be covered by protections. In Snyder v. Phelps, the target of Westboro’s protest was clearly 
an individual. Their online “epic” directly mentioned Matthew Snyder by name, with the 
location of their protest indicative of their target. As demonstrated by the case’s outcome, 
international law’s approach differs greatly from the United States. It is extremely difficult to 
legally prove cases of hate speech due to restrictions on content discrimination. As opposed to a 
country such as Germany, which forbids any speech denying the Holocaust, America errs on the 
side of freedom of expression  
While there’s no definitive answer to the why the two spheres have diverged, the US’s 
position could potentially stem from its cultural emphasis on individualism. Such individualism 
is reflected in the previously mentioned “marketplace of ideas”, where in theory each individual 
idea possesses intrinsic value. Moreover, the US culturally has a historical mistrust of placing too 
much power in the hands of the state. There is also a certain national amnesia regarding prior 
treatment of minorities. J. Michael Martin postulates that “countries like Israel, Austria, 
Germany, and South Africa with histories of horrible oppression may feel that the best way to 
remedy human rights violation is to limit the ability of citizens to harm one another by legally 
restricting free expression”,77 drawing a clear distinction between the United States and other 
countries with repressive histories. This seems an overlook of the US’s past of blatant 
discriminatory practices—including the genocide of the Native Americans, the enslavement of 
black people, Jim Crow laws, and Japanese internment camps. All of these were federally 
sanctioned. So, while America’s amnesia allows it to engage in degrees of exceptionalism, the 
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nation’s history tells a story of severe violations of human dignity. Perhaps, in that light, stronger 
hate speech laws should be considered as to avoid repeats of past atrocities and work to respect 
individuals’ rights to dignity. 
 
What is Dignity? 
The concept of “human dignity” is an intentionally complex one, enshrined in the first 
paragraph of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. “Dignity” is a broad moral notion, one 
which is inherent to every human through virtue of being human. In theory, all human beings are 
accorded an equal amount of dignity, and though dignity, rights. The concept is a fundamental 
aspect of modern day human rights and underscores the entirety of international law. In the 
UDHR, dignity is connected to our possession of reason and consciousness, with the intro to the 
declaration stating that we are “born…equal in dignity and rights.”78 Going off the natural rights 
tradition shaped by Locke and Kant, possessing rights is an inalienable part of the human 
condition. As in a human rights schema all rights are interlocked and interdependent, dignity 
serves as the underscoring factor. While dignity is considered to be inalienable, it can also be 
destroyed or damaged. The concept has played a crucial role in shaping not only the UDHR, but 
also the United Nations Charter, the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESR). Stretching beyond just a general human rights construct, dignity 
has become a core underpinning of legislation across nations. It has also served as a rallying cry 
for various causes throughout the world—ranging from the American abolition of slavery to the 
United Kingdom Labor movement. 
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While the evolution of the concept of dignity is a long and varied one, modern day 
conceptions mainly took shape post-Holocaust. The horrors of World War Two inspired a 
resurgence of international interest in a “never again” approach to preserving human dignity, as 
well as better defining it. Perhaps most significantly in the UDHR, dignity is linked to the nature 
of being born in freedom and naturally “endowed with reason and conscience.”79 Due to all 
beings being born into a state of inherent equality and possessing logic, as per Article 1, they 
therefore should “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” and work to validate each 
other’s worth. Dignity is also explicitly mentioned in Articles 22 and 23, with Article 23(3) 
concerning the right to work stating “everyone who works has the right to just and favorable 
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.”80 In the UDHR, dignity is both 
a shorthand for a general theory of human rights—one acceptable to members of varying 
ideological, cultural, and national groups—and applicable to any person, anywhere. A being does 
not have to be in possession of any particular attribute or belong to any group to possess it. Thus, 
its use in the UDHR is based in a sort of humanistic non-ideology. The insertion of dignity into 
the declaration allows for a “linguistic-symbol that can represent different outlooks, thereby 
justifying a concrete political agreement on a seemingly shared ground.”81 This is not to say that 
the broadness of the term diminishes its contextual importance in any way. Rather, the linguistic 
flexibility allows for dignity to possess meanings varying across socio-political contexts.82 As 
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such, the concept can be understood in a wide variety of ways—but at its basis, either correlating 
with human rights or serves as the foundation for them. At a minimum, dignity consists of a 
being’s intrinsic worth that ought to be recognized and respected. It also stands that certain 
behaviors towards other beings constitute a violation of their dignity. As Jack Donnelly states, 
“human rights are rooted in ‘structure’ rather than ‘culture’”, with dignity serving as a structural 
base.83   
Since dignity is a given part of rights, its invocation figures heavily into the international 
law sphere. The United Nations relies heavily on the term, with its charter’s preamble seeking to 
“reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and woman of nations large and small.”84 Beyond dignity as an overarching 
guide post for rights, the UN has come to adopt dignity to particular areas of human rights. The 
1993 Vienna World Conference saw the implementation of the term to such issues like torture, 
indigenous people’s rights, the abolition of poverty, gender-based violence, and biomedical 
issues.85 Outside the general reach of the UDHR and human right texts preambles, the concept of 
dignity has been adopted into declarations targeting key issues—with specific articles invoking 
dignity as justification for specific rights. Examples include Article 25(d) of the Convention of 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which requires “health professionals to provide 
care of the same quality to persons with disabilities as to others, including…raising awareness of 
the human rights, dignity, autonomy and needs of persons of disabilities through training and the 
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promulgation of ethical standards for public and private health care.”86 Another invocation of 
dignity in a specific article can be found in Article 39 of the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child, providing “recovery and reintegration…which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity 
of the child.”87 Mentions of dignity in particular articles of human rights text provide the term 
with a stronger contextual conception, and further justifications for its importance. The 
International Court of Justice judges frequently invoke dignity in their individual decisions, with 
domestic legislation across nations including mention of the concept. Thus, dignity serves to 
provide a background for human rights, while human rights work to ensure dignity for all. 
With international law holding dignity at its crux, its application requires a 
counterbalance between hate speech and freedom of expression. While international law treats 
dignity as a nexus, American legal structure disregards it in lieu of expression. In the case of 
Snyder v. Phelps, this can best be understood via the lens of personhood. As Alito said in his 
dissenting statement, the Snyder’s rights to personhood were violated by Westboro’s actions.  
Dignity underpins the right to personhood, relating back to Snyder’s initial claims of defamation, 
publicity given to private life, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Though 
disregarding such violations, the Fourth District Court’s conclusion regarding WBC’s use of hate 
speech violated the Snyders’ right to personhood. It also threatened the personhoods of 
marginalized groups, infringing upon their dignity and ability to fully perform as democratic 
citizens.  
 
                                               
86 United Nations General Assembly, Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (3 
May 2006) A/RES/61/106, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-
rights-of-persons-with-disabilities/article-25-health.html, accessed 1/15/18 
87 United Nations General Assembly, Convention of the Rights of the Child, (2 September 1990) 
44/25, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx, accessed 1/15/18, Article 39 
 40 
Personhood and Hate Speech 
In order to be granted rights, one must possess the status of personhood—a status which 
runs the metaphysical gamut (Is a fetus afforded human rights? A brain-dead individual? A 
forest? etc.)  In the context of international human rights law, personhood can be understood as 
stemming from theories of natural rights. This is understood in modernity best via the philosophy 
of Hegel, who understood people as completely independent individuals who each view 
themselves as possessing intrinsic supreme value.88 When encountering another individual, each 
finds the others sense of internal value threatens their own. Thus, the struggle for recognition 
between the individuals comes into play, which can only be resolved through reaching mutual 
recognition of the others value. This mutual recognition makes up not only the basis of human 
rights, but statehood and citizenship. Without mutual recognition—of both the civic and the 
individual—society cannot functionally operate. And with recognition of the other as the basis, 
respect for one’s fellow beings provides the basis for human rights. Article 6 of the UDHR states 
that “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law,” with Article 
16 of the ICCPR asserting a nearly identical statement. Beyond the judicial, hate speech 
undermines a person’s right to recognition. Through the lens of respecting personhood, hate 
speech can be understood as “reflecting the stage of consciousness in which individuals find 
themselves deeply threatened by the selfhood of others and respond by trying to dominate or 
destroy them.”89 The WBC’s dehumanization of Matthew Snyder dismantled his and his family’s 
personhood, as well as engaged in homophobia. Though the invocation of the hatred of a 
supreme being, it reduced the targeted parties to subhuman and deserving of suffering.  
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 The harms of hate speech to personhood, particularly when protected by freedom of 
expression, are numerous. Article 3 of the UDHR grants the right to personal security, 
guaranteeing “life, liberty, and security of person.”90 Additionally, Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person.”91 Beyond just freedom from unlawful imprisonment, possessing security entails 
positive protection by the state to prevent threats to individual’s liberty. In terms of the Westboro 
Baptist Church, their aggressive vernacular and use of slurs—on a massive publicized scale—
contribute to the erosion of both its target’s personal security, and the overall environment. 
Through the WBC’s aggressive picketing, the targets of their attacks suffer losses to elements of 
their personal safety. Even though the WBC do not engage in any physical altercations, Snyder 
cited suffering worsening health as a result of their verbal assaults against his son, specifically 
citing his diabetes. The WBC additionally violated his, and his dead son’s, personality rights. 
Such rights, even though they aren’t explicitly mentioned in international law, are inherently 
linked to natural rights and human dignity. Personality rights entail the right to exist in the public 
sphere and still retain control over their image, as well as the right to privacy. Even though the 
Fourth District Court of Appeals deemed Snyder a public figure, the WBC’s targeting of Cpl. 
Snyder post-mortem—notably, the online epic directly calling him by name—appears a violation 
of the subject’s personality rights, and thus a violation of dignity. And despite Snyder’s judicially 
deemed status as a public figure, “individuals do not cease to be persons when they participate in 
the public life of the community, and they should not be required to wholly sacrifice their 
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personality rights to do so.”92 Public figures are still people, afforded the same right to dignity as 
private figures possess.   
 
Harm-prevention paradigms 
Limiting violations to dignity, especially in a Constitutional free speech state, is no easy 
task. In order to make the argument that there should be legislative restrictions on hate speech, 
there must be appropriate legal, civic, and morale rationales. As suggested by Robert Mark 
Simpson, such a rationale can be found in the harm-prevention paradigm. It is not enough to say 
that hate speech is merely offensive—that it is wrong or hurtful, or that such speakers of speech 
deserve to be punished. Rationales that could be “overridden by considerations that countervail 
against legal restrictions on any conduct (e.g. costliness, risk of inefficacy, risk of sinister 
misuse)” or any other free speech concerns must be justified via an establishment of real harm.93 
Going beyond just hurt feelings, invoking real emotional harm as a potential byproduct of hate 
speech infuses cases with more merit. But to do so, it must be proven that there is harm 
perpetuated by speakers of hate speech towards their targets. The targets must be negatively 
impacted as a result. In order to better establish a precedent for determining hate speech, the 
harm-prevention framework must distinguish between types of harms—namely, direct and 
indirect harm.94 It is obviously possible for an individual to be on the receiving end of a racial 
slur, and to suffer emotional distress as a result. This would be a case of direct harm towards an 
individual. However, the consequences of hate speech ripple beyond just the individual target. 
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Though the use of hate speech, harmful social hierarchies can be built or further established, 
resulting in a toxic and unequal societal environment. Such an environment works to erode 
individuals’ basic human dignity. Simpson likens such occurrences to that of pollution—in 
which “even when there are no specifiable victims, all acts of pollution have a degrading impact 
on environmental systems whose degradation beyond a certain point does inflict harms on 
individuals.”95 In an indirect matter, hate speech aids in creating to a toxic socio-political 
environment ranging past any one targeted individual or group. This creates major problems for 
a healthy and functioning democratic state, as individuals become dissuaded and unsure of status 
within the structure.  
If the uttering of a racial slur creates a poisoned environment, then the WBC’s protest 
tactics seem to be especially offensive. Through their mastery of media manipulation, 
Westboro’s platform extends beyond just their legally sanctioned protest sites. The group has 
reached levels of infamy in America as one of the country’s most disdained, and well known, 
hate groups. Despite the WBC being widely scorned by wider American society, they’re still 
attract no small amount of attention to their causes via their shock tactics and offensive language. 
With their extensive coverage by the media, Westboro’s hate speech has infiltrated the American 
lexicon. The statement “God Hates Fags” is an instantly identifiable one as tied to the WBC. As 
previously mentioned, the WBC’s use of distorted communication aids in contributing to an 
unequal society, making their targets feel unheard and unwelcome. The current digital age also 
calls into question limitations of speech and harm, with WBC’s online epic targeting Matthew 
Snyder made accessible to anyone. Within the harm prevention paradigm, the WBC’s speech and 
actions result in both direct and indirect harms.  
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A potential solution to the tension between free speech and hate speech requires 
recognition of interdependence between rights. Stephen Heyman proposes a four-pronged 
approach to recognizing the importance of freedom of expression while still limiting its harms. 
The four parts include consideration of  “(1) the external world; (2) the internal realm of thought 
and feeling; (3) the social and political domain; (4) the sphere of intellect and spirit.”96 Freedom 
is fundamentally linked to autonomy in the external world, independence without outside 
intrusion. Heyman states that while freedom of speech is a “form of outward liberty…or the 
ability to act as one likes,” misuse of the freedom violates others’ “right to personal security” as 
well as the collective’s right to freedom from violence.97 The second rationale involves the 
natural right to self-realization. When speech is prohibited excessively, the individual’s capacity 
for internal growth and recognition of own desires and being is stunted. However, one’s other 
internal rights—such as the rights to dignity, security, and privacy—are threatened by hate 
speech. Such violations are protected by the tort doctrine that affords a remedy for intentional 
and unjustified infliction of severe emotional distress.”98 But as demonstrated in Synder v. 
Phelps, this tort doctrine is often overshadowed by the judicial emphasis on preserving freedom 
of expression.99 Heyman’s third point concerns the right of citizens to participate in their 
governmental processes. While freedom of speech is crucial for a functioning democracy, the 
freedom requires cooperation with one’s fellow citizens. Accordingly, this right is a social one, 
requiring the honoring of other’s internal and external rights. Hate speech limits the abilities of 
the deemed “other” to fully participate in the democracy. With this in mind, when partaking in 
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the democratic process, the collective’s corresponding rights must be taken into account.100 
Finally, the right to intellectual and spiritual freedom also requires social cooperation. Truth 
seeking is “a relational right, which should be exercised with due regard to others.”101 An 
example of the right to intellectual freedom violating others’ internal rights includes Holocaust 
denial--often presented under the guide of legitimate research-- in academia. So even though 
freedom of expression is a crucial for proper execution of the Constitutional process, other rights 
are of equal importance and must be taken into account. Thus, Heyman’s rights-based outline 
provides a broader context for considering freedom of speech in relation to other rights. The 
natural rights structure is also prevalent in the UDHR and ICCPR, with the UDHR’s preamble 
stating, “all members of the human family” possess “inherent dignity….and equal and 
inalienable rights,” with Article I specifically noting that “all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”102   
 
Conclusion 
 While freedom of expression is undoubtedly a hallmark of a free and functioning society, 
hate speech is a corrosive element to human dignity. As dignity is an integral part of human 
rights and vice versa, the United States’ reliance on solely indictment-based measures allows 
major violations to rights to personhood. The valuing of freedom of expression over dignity 
allows groups like the Westboro Baptist Church to target innocent victims on macro and micro 
scales. Individuals like the Snyders suffer extreme emotional duress, while the WBC’s hate 
speech works towards their aims of polluting the social atmosphere. There are no effective laws 
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to limit their legally savvy speech tactics. Even though America’s legal system possesses certain 
torts which, in theory, allow individuals to challenge on the basis of emotional distress, such torts 
are perpetually secondary to freedom of expression. The most effective tool for combating hate 
speech is legal regulation. The law is a theoretical extension of wants of society, serving as an 
“expressive function in signaling to affected groups that the institutions of the society do not 
endorse or in any way validate the views (of the hate group) that are being expressed.”103 
Through a nation’s possession of prohibitory laws against hate speech, it motions to both hate 
groups and victims of hate speech that such actions are not condoned by the wider politico-
culture. Laws signal that the vast majority of a populace--although it may not always come about 
in practice—stand either against or for a particular set of ideals. Such laws attempt to establish a 
more just society, one without hatred directed against a person’s creed, religion, or race. To 
allow room for judicially sanctioned hate speech is to legally sanction the violation of an 
individual’s rights—be it to security, privacy, or dignity.  
Simspson’s harm reduction paradigm and Heyman’s rights-based context offer potential 
approaches to better determine the range of hate speech. In order to respect beings’ rights to 
dignity—and allow them the abilities to reach their full personhood—America ought to implant 
stronger hate speech legal clauses in accordance with human rights norms. While no easy task, 
the diversity of American culture requires a consideration of inclusivity. The so called American 
melting pot should possess laws ensuring that all are respected under the law. Furthermore, there 
ought to be an acknowledgement—especially accounting for America’s storied past—of 
vulnerable groups. Minorities historically subjected to discrimination deserve to feel secure that 
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they are a part of America’s social fabric, just as much as anyone else. The American collective 
and the American individual are intrinsically parallel, “represent(ing) different descriptions of 
the same phenomenon: the experience of a society in which all citizens are political and legal 
equals, and all citizens experience that sense of equality.”104 Hate speech serves to smear an 
individual for belonging to a group and the group itself. Without effective tools to address these 
smears, the dignity of the democratic collective suffers. The failure of America to label obvious 
instances of hate speech as such—and thereby prosecute—is a failure at protecting human 
dignity as defined by human rights norms. 
This is not to diminish the importance of freedom of expression. Free speech is a crucial 
aspect of human rights, and accordingly hate speech laws should not be impulsive and 
reactionary. But yet, as Judge Alito stated, speech like the Westboro Baptist Church’s does 
nothing to contribute to public debate. As shown by numerous flaws in the marketplace of ideas 
construct, not all ideas deserve equal consideration. Ideologies which rely on constructs of 
discrimination do nothing to better a functioning democracy. It only harms the dignity of its 
targets, in both a direct and indirect manners. By America adopting a rights-based approach to 
hate speech, one grounded in the principles of preserving and furthering dignity, the state can 
ensure that its civilians do not suffer exclusion or harm. The basis of the American Constitution 
stemmed from Locke’s natural rights-based approach, one which valued the inherent dignity of 
beings and sought to safeguard it. Accordingly, there ought to be stronger domestic judicial 
processes aiming to negate the impact of hate speech—and thus better protect the dignity of 
Americans.  
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